Johan Nilsson / TT
In early 2026, US President Donald J. Trump again called for the United States to assert control over Greenland, stating that Chinese and Russian vessels were surrounding Greenland and that Washington needed to act quickly to prevent Beijing from gaining influence there. These claims raised questions about whether Chinese ships are actually operating near Greenland, whether China still has investment on the island, what China wants from Greenland, and what Greenland itself seeks from China.
In this Q&A, Patrik Andersson answers some of the most frequently asked questions concerning Chinese interests and activities around Greenland.
Q 1: Is there Chinese naval activity around Greenland?
A: There is no evidence of Chinese warships operating near Greenland. Claims that such ships are “all over the place” around Greenland are not supported by available intelligence or vessel-tracking data, and Nordic diplomats and military officials have also rejected these claims as baseless.
China is active in other parts of the Arctic, mainly in or near Russia’s Arctic zone, where it cooperates with Russia on energy projects and shipping along the northern sea route. The Arctic is a large and complex region, made up of different sub-regions with very different political and strategic dynamics.
Since 2022, China and Russia have conducted joint military activities in Arctic-adjacent regions – but far closer to the US state of Alaska than Greenland. They have carried out joint naval drills in the Bering Sea, close to the Aleutian Islands. In 2024, a joint aerial patrol reached further north into the Chukchi Sea, and their coastguards patrolled together in the Arctic Ocean for the first time. But all this activity is very far away from Greenland.
Q 2: Are there currently any Chinese investments or other activities in Greenland?
A: Chinese activities in Greenland today are extremely limited. While there was some Chinese involvement in planned mining projects in Greenland in the 2010s, as well as a few failed attempts to invest in infrastructure, only one investment remains: Shenghe Resources’ stake in the stalled Kuannersuit (Kvanefjeld) rare earth project. Shenghe, which plays a key role in China’s rare earth strategy overseas, is a shareholder in the Australian mother company of the local Greenlandic subsidiary that holds the license for the project, Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals).
However, the Kuannersuit project has been halted indefinitely since the Greenlandic government reimposed the ban on uranium mining in 2021 (in the Kuannersuit deposit, the main minerals that contain rare earth elements also contain uranium, which means that uranium would be an inevitable byproduct of any rare earth mining). Because of strong local opposition to uranium mining, there is little prospect of it advancing anytime soon.
Beyond that, China’s physical presence in Greenland is minimal. Only 66 Chinese nationals were registered residents in Greenland in 2025, compared with for example 1,110 Filipinos, 399 Thai, and 118 Sri Lankans. Since around 2017, a few dozen Chinese seasonal workers have regularly worked in the fish processing industry in Greenland. China is, however, a key market for Greenlandic seafood exports. This is a very important trade for Greenland and something that it wants to maintain and expand.
Q 3: Why did Chinese mining investments fail or never materialize?
A: The main reasons Chinese investments were not sustained or failed to materialize vary between sectors and have also evolved over time.
In the mining sector, they mainly had to do with logistical, economic, and in some cases regulatory challenges that stalled projects early on, and later with growing geopolitical pushback.
Nuuk began to more actively court Chinese investment after gaining self-rule in 2009, which granted Greenland autonomy over most policy areas, including economic and industrial policy (Denmark retains final authority over foreign policy, defense and national security, with Greenland participating).
Many Greenlandic policymakers saw large-scale mining investments – especially from China – as essential for developing a more diversified and independent economy, less reliant on financial support from Denmark. Such economic diversification was viewed as a precondition for formal independence, which remains the long-term aspiration of most Greenlanders.
Diplomatic exchanges with China, along with active Greenlandic courting of Chinese investment – including repeatedly sending delegations to the annual China Mining Conference and Expo in Tianjin – did attract some Chinese interest.
These efforts led to Chinese involvement in a few planned projects, mainly as partners. But none of those resulted in actual mining.
At the Citronen Fjord zinc project in the far north, where the engineering and construction arm of China Nonferrous Metal Mining was involved in the mid-2010s, logistical challenges have long made development difficult. At the Isua iron ore project north of Nuuk, which was acquired cheaply by the Hong Kong-based company General Nice in 2015 after the collapse in iron ore prices, the lack of economic viability prevented progress, and the company later lost the license due to inactivity. And for the Kuannersuit project, the reinstatement of the uranium ban in 2021 has halted progress indefinitely.
Surveys of Greenland’s mineral deposits show great resource potential. But the lack of infrastructure, technical difficulties, and high operating costs present huge challenges. These are not unique to Greenland but apply to many other Arctic environments as well. This helps explain why mining in Greenland has historically been limited and why relatively few companies – Chinese, American, or others – have invested.
In recent years, geopolitical pushback has emerged as an additional major factor preventing Chinese investment in mining. However, with the exception of Kuannersuit, which – as noted above – was halted in 2021 because of the uranium ban, most of the projects involving Chinese companies had already stalled before the United States began to more actively push back against Chinese activities in Greenland during the first Trump administration (2017-2021).
Since then, scrutiny of Chinese activity in Greenland has increased to the point where Chinese companies have become far more cautious about Greenland and turned their attention elsewhere. Greenland minister Naaja Nathanielsen echoed this trend in an interview with the Financial Times in May 2025, when she noted that China’s interest in mining deals was very limited at the time and suggested that Chinese investors might be holding back to avoid provoking backlash.
In sum, when it comes to investment in the mining sector, the economic, logistical and regulatory constraints came first and still matter, while geopolitical risks have grown over time and are now just as important.
Q 4: Why did Chinese infrastructure investment not materialize?
A: In the infrastructure sector, US and Danish intervention was the decisive reason that Chinese investments did not materialize. In the case of the 2018 tender to extend airport runways in Nuuk and Ilulissat and build a new airport in Qaqortoq, the shortlisted Chinese candidate – China Communications Construction Company – was effectively pushed out when Denmark stepped in to provide around half of the financing. The move was widely seen as aimed at excluding the Chinese firm. And when General Nice tried to acquire a decommissioned Danish naval base in 2016, the Danish government, responding to US pressure, intervened directly by taking the facility off the market, reinvesting in it, and reopening it.
A different type of case emerged in 2017, when there were reports of a “launch ceremony” in Kangerlussuaq for a project that would result in a Chinese satellite ground station in Greenland. While early Chinese-language reporting implied that the Greenlandic government had been involved, Greenlandic officials, who would have to approve such a project, denied knowledge of its existence.
The episode appears to have ended before any formal approval process was initiated and the subsequent backlash effectively prevented the project from moving forward. Reporting noted the attendance of over a hundred Chinese researchers and businessmen at the event, including a rear admiral in the PLA Navy, all of whom had traveled there on tourist visas. This reinforced concerns about the potential dual-use functions of such a satellite ground station.
Q 5: Are Chinese investments in Greenland likely in the near future?
A: No. Even if the broader political conditions remain unchanged – meaning Greenland stays within the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States does not assert greater control over Greenland – substantial Chinese investment is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. This is especially the case for investment in infrastructure or critical minerals.
Q 6: Why is substantial new Chinese investment unlikely?
A: Because the high geopolitical risks for Chinese companies discourage them to invest there, and because of strong opposition from the United States and Denmark. Beijing itself has also become much more cautious about Greenland and appears to be discouraging investment there.
Washington, especially during the Trump administration, has made clear that it intends to prevent China from gaining a strategic foothold in Greenland. It would likely apply various forms of pressure on Denmark and Greenland to stop that from happening.
To be sure, Greenland has extensive autonomy over most policy areas, including the development of its mineral resources, and it is currently developing its own investment screening mechanism. But under the formal division of responsibilities between Denmark and Greenland, Copenhagen retains final authority over defense and national security issues. Given today’s geopolitical environment, any substantial new Chinese investment in infrastructure or critical minerals could likely be framed and treated by Denmark as a national security issue.
While Denmark insists that it has the authority to block foreign activities that threaten national security, using that power directly would strain relations with Greenland. Copenhagen has therefore preferred not to exercise this power openly, instead opting for quieter and more indirect methods. But the awareness that Denmark can intervene – directly or indirectly – if it deems an activity a national security threat, combined with the expectation of a forceful US response, likely deters most Chinese efforts in the first place. In any case, it makes it highly unlikely that a Chinese strategic investment could be realized in Greenland in the foreseeable future.
In addition, geopolitics has increasingly turned Chinese involvement into a liability for Western companies operating in the critical minerals sector. As the US and other Western governments step up efforts to build supply chains independent of China, many project owners now have strong incentives to minimize or phase out Chinese participation. Energy Transition Minerals, for example, has in recent years appeared to increasingly downplay the role of its Chinese shareholder Shenghe and is reportedly aiming to replace Chinese capital with American investors. This trend further reduces the likelihood of new Chinese investment in Greenland.
This does not mean that Chinese companies will never test the waters. In early 2025, Reuters reported that the United States (and Denmark) had lobbied the owner of the Tanbreez rare earth project (also known as the Killavaat Alannguat, or Kringlerne project) not to sell to Chinese-linked buyers, citing the company’s CEO. Chinese interest in this case is difficult to verify: Reuters did not identify the Chinese companies involved and the report noted that details of how payment would be made were unclear. But the case nevertheless illustrates how US opposition can be effective in shaping outcomes, without Denmark needing to openly or legally intervene. The project was later sold to a US company.
Q 7: How important was (and is) Greenland in China’s Arctic strategy?
A: Overall, Greenland has been a secondary concern in China’s Arctic strategy, especially when it comes to sustained investment and prioritization.
While the Chinese state has shown some interest – evident from the involvement of state-owned companies in mining projects and the airport package tender – Beijing’s Arctic priorities have primarily focused elsewhere: energy projects in the Russian Arctic and the development of shipping along the Northern Sea Route. Compared to Russia and the Nordic states, China’s interest in Greenland has been modest.
Where interest has existed, it has largely come from specific parts of the state system. Researchers and officials at the Ministry of Natural Resources (until 2018 the Ministry of Land and Resources) have shown interest in Greenland’s mineral deposits. Greenland has also attracted attention within China’s Arctic research sector, including space science (as illustrated by the failed satellite ground station proposal, which raised Western concerns due to the dual-use potential). The establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative and its Arctic component – the Polar Silk Road – further encouraged companies, bureaucrats and researchers to frame their activities in Greenland as part of this policy.
Even when Chinese investments were less politically sensitive in the West, Greenland remained a relatively niche concern, which mainly interested actors in mineral resources, research, and shipping. When I spoke with Chinese companies at the China Mining Conference and Expo in 2019, most representatives knew little of Arctic mining and had not considered it, though they were intrigued by my questions.
In many ways, Chinese interest in Greenland has been exploratory and perhaps opportunistic in some cases, focused on future mining opportunities, scientific activities (with potential dual‑use applications), and the long-term possibilities of Arctic shipping. Chinese academic debates reflect this: some Arctic scholars have speculated about Greenland’s role for the Polar Silk Road and the geopolitical implications of possible independence, which they saw as potentially offering opportunities for China to gain an Arctic foothold. At present, however, independence would instead almost certainly deepen Greenland’s security reliance on the United States and give the US even greater leverage to block Chinese activities than it has today.
Q 8: What does Greenland seek from its relationship with China?
A: Today, the Greenland-China relationship is primarily economic and trade-centered. Nuuk is keen to expand its export of seafood to China, which is a key trade for Greenland that poses no serious national security concerns for Denmark or the United States. Greenland has expressed an aspiration to reach a free trade agreement with China, likely with the hope of promoting seafood and other non-sensitive trade with Beijing. While Nuuk previously sought to attract Chinese investment in mining, such hopes appear to have faded in recent years due to shifting geopolitical conditions.
Even as the United States warns against Chinese influence, Nuuk has at times appeared to “reach out” to Beijing in a way that some have found provocative in Denmark and the United States. While in the past, such efforts may have aimed at attracting Chinese investment, they have also increasingly served another purpose: to encourage Europe and the United States to offer their own investments to counter Chinese proposals (a Greenlandic official echoed this thinking in 2018, telling me that they like to “put countries against each other” and in that way incentivize other countries to act). This strategy has brought positive results for Nuuk: since 2019, the United States, Denmark and the European Union have all stepped up investment in and economic aid to Greenland.
