22 oktober, 2024
Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic: Implications for Nordic countries and recommended policy responses
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Summary
- Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia and China pledged to strengthen their cooperation in the Arctic. This report examines the prospects for increased collaboration between Russia and China in the region, focusing on energy, critical minerals, shipping, military and security issues, and governance. It also explores potential scenarios for and the possible consequences of Sino-Russian cooperation for Nordic states in each of these areas and makes policy recommendations.
- The main consequence of increased Sino-Russian energy cooperation in the Arctic is that revenue from Chinese energy imports is fuelling Russia’s war economy. Despite pledges to strengthen energy ties, however, Chinese partners have paused participation in a flagship Russian energy project and appear reluctant to commit to future projects. This highlights the limitations of the energy partnership. Chinese energy companies are likely to continue to balance support for Russian energy projects with the need to avoid western sanctions. To reduce Russian revenues from Arctic energy exports, western governments should focus on enforcing and monitoring existing sanctions. A price cap on Russian gas could also be considered.
- While there are signs of increased collaboration on the mining and processing of critical minerals, Russia remains cautious about becoming over-dependent on China and lacks access to advanced processing technology, which China is unlikely to share. A “critical mineral alliance” between the two countries is therefore unlikely. Nordic countries should work to reduce their reliance on China by enhancing EU cooperation and developing supplementary supply chains and processing capacity.
- Increased Russian energy shipments to China via the Northern Sea Route heighten the risk of an oil spill, as sanctions have led Russia to use less safe vessels. The partial suspension of Arctic governance mechanisms, which mitigated risks and ensured a swift response, has increased this threat. Nordic countries should continue to support the resumption of Arctic Council working group activities. They could also consider additional sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet.
- China and Russia have held high-profile joint military exercises in the Arctic but it is unclear whether this indicates a genuine intention to cooperate more closely or is mainly posturing aimed at deterring the US and its allies. China’s lack of a permanent military presence and its weaker military interests in the region compared to Russia’s constrain deeper cooperation. Rather than a potential Sino-Russian alliance, the main military threat to Nordic countries in the Arctic currently comes from Russia. Nonetheless, Sino-Russian cooperation on dual-use research and technologies could present risks to Nordic countries that warrant careful evaluation.
- Arctic governance remains a point of friction between Russia, which supports the status quo, and China, which is dissatisfied with the current structure. By continuing to support the existing governance framework, Nordic countries can leverage this friction. This approach would also help to confine some aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation to the Arctic Council and other regional multilateral bodies, where it can be more easily monitored. Sino-Russian cooperation in this area appears relatively limited for the time being, which suggests that the potential risks from this collaboration are relatively low.
- Sino-Russian cooperation varies according to area, each of which has unique limits and risks that require tailored responses. The wholesale exclusion or isolation of China and Russia from Arctic cooperation is neither realistic nor desirable and could backfire, potentially driving them closer together. Strict limits on collaboration with Russia will remain in place for the foreseeable future. The challenge will be to balance strong pressure on and isolation of Russia while managing limited cooperation on critical areas such as climate research, which has been severely compromised by the lack of Russian data, and preventing Russia from forming new alliances with China and other “Russia-friendly” countries in these domains.