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Summary
- This report examines the scope and market impacts of the mineral export controls introduced by China between 2023 and 2025. It summarises the timing and context of the measures and analyses changes in export volumes, destinations and prices, both in China and abroad. Further, it assesses the underlying motives, potential next steps, and implications for Europe and Sweden.
- The report finds that the first wave of Chinese mineral export controls in 2023–2024, covering gallium, germanium, graphite and antimony, was primarily a response to US technology restrictions on semiconductors and advanced computing. The second wave, in 2025, which included controls on rare earth elements, was instead primarily imposed as an additional tool in the broader trade and tariff war with the United States.
- The controls have played an important role in shaping the course and outcome of the US-China technology and trade conflicts so far. They may also have been aimed, in part, at influencing EU trade policy, particularly decisions on electric vehicle tariffs.
- Beyond their use as diplomatic and trade leverage, China’s export controls also serve additional objectives, including reinforcing its dominance in global mineral supply chains, promoting domestic value-added production by keeping prices lower at home and higher abroad, and constraining Western defence capabilities by limiting access to critical materials.
- Quantitatively, the global effects of the controls have been significant, reflecting China’s dominant role in critical mineral supply. All investigated minerals experienced substantial temporary falls in export volumes following implementation, and several have seen permanent reductions and sharp price increases. Some countries, notably the US and the Netherlands, have faced de-facto complete export bans even before any official bans.
- While the temporary reduction in rare earth magnet exports drew considerable attention in 2025, the first wave of controls has experienced the most significant tightening. Exports of unwrought gallium have been near zero throughout 2025, with prices up by 365 percent in Europe. Wrought germanium exports have fallen by 60 percent, with prices rising 400 percent, while antimony exports have also been close to zero, accompanied by a 437 percent price spike.
- The main determinant of future Chinese export controls in the short to medium term lies in the state of US-China relations. If the truce following the Xi-Trump meeting in October 2025 is upheld, this should lead to an easing of restrictions. However, a breakdown and renewed escalation would likely result in tighter measures, potentially through strengthening of existing controls, expansion to additional minerals, and stricter enforcement of transhipment bans.
- For Europe and Sweden, the controls present both risks and opportunities. Higher prices and potential supply shortages pose risks for several strategic sectors, notably defence, energy, and information technology. At the same time, elevated prices, as well as policy initiatives, create incentives for countermeasures such as diversifying production and refining, building strategic stockpiles, expanding recycling capacity and substitution. With its mineral deposits and relatively low energy costs, Sweden is well positioned to contribute to these developments.
- However, these countermeasures will take time to yield results, leaving a near-term window in which China’s leverage remains considerable. During this period, various forms of European economic deterrence may be necessary to prevent supply restrictions. The alternative for securing access to minerals would likely involve policy concessions to China.
