The United Front dilemma in democratic societies

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Front work – its primary method of co-opting and neutralizing political opposition – is difficult for democratic states to address. On the one hand, United Front activities are conducted within the framework of free institutions, including business, academia, and the cultural sector, whose independence must be protected in a democracy. On the other hand, there is growing awareness among researchers and policymakers that China’s influence operations weaken and divide their target societies and ultimately serve to grow the global power of an undemocratic regime. The greater China’s influence becomes, the harder it becomes to ignore this dilemma. 

Arguments for and against tolerance 

The first part of the dilemma is that United Front activities are often legal per se, and are protected by the democratic freedoms of association, organization, and expression. Connections to the United Front do not necessarily imply political loyalty to the CCP. In some cases, those involved may be originally independent individuals whom the party is attempting to recruit. Furthermore, the United Front heavily targets the Chinese diaspora, and democratic states are justifiably reluctant to take measures that could be perceived as targeting a particular ethnic group. These are all arguments in favour of a tolerant approach to United Front activities. 

The second part of the dilemma concerns the importance of the United Front to the CCP. The CCP is the world’s most powerful political organization. It espouses openly undemocratic values and operates globally on a scale that far exceeds that of any other extremist groups routinely considered threats to democratic society. The Party regards the United Front as a central element of its political struggle and as a tool for aligning institutions and civil society organizations abroad with its objectives. During Xi Jinping’s time in power, the United Front has received increased funding and expanded its mandate. From this perspective, there is an argument for treating all connections to the CCP as latent security risks and responding accordingly. 

Possible countermeasures – the case of Sweden 

In policy terms, the challenge is to strike a balance that hampers the CCP’s activities while safeguarding democratic freedoms. The correct response must take national circumstances into account, and in the Swedish context, possible policy options include stricter scrutiny of CCP-linked organizations’ sources of funding, in line with the new proposal on foreign financing of religious communities and other organizations. Another option would be to apply the democracy requirement on public funding of civil society organizations in such a way that CCP ties are always seen as grounds for denial of funding. 

A conceivable step further could be to ban political organizations with links to the CCP, such as the “Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification,” whose objective is to incorporate Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China. However, this would require an amendment to the Swedish Constitution similar to the restriction on freedom of association for terrorist organizations introduced in 2023, and would thus be highly politically sensitive. 

Alexis von Sydow